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Newsletter #230

A Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority

November, 1990

Gulf Crisis
We Still Won't Go
In this issue ofResist we solicited two perspectives on the current crisis in the Persian Gulf. Joe Gerson, of the American
Friends Service Committee in New England, focuses on why Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait, and the meaning of the
U.S. reaction in terms of the post-Cold
War realignment of power in the world.
Irene Gendzier, who teaches the history of
the Middle East at Boston University and
is the author of several books on political
development in the region, stresses the historical antecedents to the crisis, deploring
the "dismal state of the discourse" on
U.S/Middle East policies. Both writers
agree that the time has come to demand
an end to the consensus by silence on U.S.
hegemony in the region and to force by
our protests the immediate withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. Though
this is the goal, we at Resist believe it may
indeed be some time before the crisis subsides. In the coming months, we hope to
print additional perspectives on shifting
political alliances in the Middle East, and
on strategies and tactics for the peace
movement at home. We are particularly
interested in the point of view of women
and ethnic minorities in the region. If you
have comments or suggestions for Resist
articles on these topics, please contact our
newsletter editor, Tatiana Schreiber, at the
office. For information about organizing
efforts in the Boston area, contact the
Mobilization for Survival at (617) 3540008. Nationally, call (212) 385-2222.
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New Order ''In a World Gone Mad"

If you are in the process of writing or
amending your Will, you might think about
leaving a set sum or a percentage to Resist,
Inc. Over the last year a number of you have
contacted us directly or through a lawyer,
informing us of your decision to include us in
your Will. For all of you who took that
difficult but important s~p of writing a Will,
and including Resist 'in it, we are most
appreciative. Wills can be a significant way
of making sure the work you support today
will be around for decades to come. And
because Resist, Inc. is a non-profit, tax
exempt corporation, including us in your Will
can help lower or eliminate estate taxes.
When including Resist in your Will,
please identify us as follows: ''Resist, Inc., a
Massachusetts non-profit corporation whose
principal place of business is located in
Somerville, Massachusetts." If you have any
questions about including Resist in your Will,
or if you need a copy of our tax exempt IRS
letter, please feel free to write or call the
office.

JOSEPH GERSON

The

period of U.S. preparation for war
against Iraq is drawing to a close. The
United States has assembled more than
20.0,000 troops, an aerial armada, and a
naval flotilla in Saudi Arabia, other Gulf
states, Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and the
Arabian Sea. President Bush has staked
his political future on Iraq's unconditional
withdrawal from Kuwait, even as his
administration is opposing Iraqi, Arab and
French diplomatic efforts to provide Hussein a face-saving way to leave Iraq. Tune
is running out. In the words of Senator
Kennedy: "The President is heading for
war - perhaps next week, perhaps next
month, but almost certainly by the end of
the year." With the new year will come
sand stonns and then intense desert heat
- two more reasons that war is likely to
be launched sooner rather than later.
This will not be a replay of Panama or
Grenada. The toll is likely to be thousands
of U.S. lives, hundreds of thousands of
Iraqi and Kuwaiti lives, the devastation of
the land, and the disappearance of whatever shred of respect lingers for the U.S. in
the Middle East
The 1980s provided dress rehearsals
for this war: the Iraq/Iran war, and U.S.
military intervention on Iraq's behalf; the
invasions of Grenada and Panama;
hostages and U.S. Marines in Lebanon;
economic embargoes against Nicaragua,
Vietnam and Cambodia; the budget battle
and the battle for "burdensharing"; war
games in Egypt and the construction of
U.S. bases in Saudi sands and in nations
surrounding the Gulf. The rehearsals are
over and the struggle is now on to shape
the contours of the post-Cold War era.
Would that issues were simple, either/
or, black and white. Saddam Hussein has
long been among the world's most vicious
dictators. The pillage of Kuwait and the
terrorization of its people are but the
(il)logical extension of his brutal rule. The
Iraqi conquest of Kuwait can only be condemned and resisted. But, as U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar repeated, the
U. S. exceeded the Security Council's
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Boston Demo, 1990. Photo:
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m~date by unilaterally deploying military
forces and establishing a blockade - an
act of war - against Iraq. As King Hussein of Jordan desperately observed, the
U.S. deployments have made the confrontation far more dangerous, a "crisis in
a world gone mad." The U.N. called for
sanctions and an embargo, not war. The
Soviet Union has thus far refused to give
the U.S. a U.N. flag and a carte blanche
for a war the U.N. cannot control.
There is cruel irony in that the U.S.
re-conquered Panama just last December,
and secret mass graves of Panamanian
civilian victims of that war are just now
being discovered. Moreover, the U.S.'s
allies in the Gulf confrontation include
Turkey, which has occupied portions of
Cyprus for 16 years; Morocco, which has
occupied the Spanish Sahara since the fall
of Franco; Syria with its 40,000 troops in
Lebanon; and of course, Israel which has
militarily occupied the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip for 23 years and which has
annexed the occupied Golan Heights and
Palestinian East Jerusalem.
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The Gulf Crisis:
Unasked Questions on the U.S. in the Middle East
IRENE GENDZIER

A

political earthquake is in the making in the Persian Gulf. Whatever the outcome, and the options are few, it is safe to
say that the Middle East will not be the
same. This is not a lament, but a reflection
on the dimensions of a crisis as complex
as it is divisive and dangerous for the peoples of the region. From the initial invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, to the response it
evoked in the U.S. and the West, the multiplicity of issues involved is staggering,
the stakes are high, the conflicts deep and
the potential for massive destruction evident Everywhere there is fear, uncertainty,
and a deep disquiet about what tomorrow
will bring.
In the Middle East, the crisis has
exposed the disparate, desperate, and contradictory nature of Arab state politics.
Simmering beneath the frantic movements
of Arab leaders for political expediency
are deeply rooted divisions of states, searing class conflicts, the frustrations of dealing with repressive regimes, and pervasive
despair generated by unresolved conflicts
in the region.
This explosive combination of factors
was not created by the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait The alienation, anger and despair
were everywhere to be seen prior to Iraq's
recent aggression. But the mobilization by
the U.S. of a vast military armada stationed in Saudi Arabia has - far more
than the reaction of the U.S.S.R. or the
United Nations - catapulted Arab
regimes out of their habitual alliances, and
alerted them to the dangers from belo.w,
from the ready anger of their own masses.
There is another kind of crisis brewing, this one at home. It involves the
widening gap between a U.S. military
force poised for war, and a population
becoming increasingly resentful and
apprehensive about this country's economic recession. The budget debacle, the
threat of economic depression, and
widespread discontent with. political
incumbents may combine to force Americans to rethink the costs of the U.S.
response to the Gulf crisis. The absence of
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any sustained discussion of what U.S.
interests are or should be, of how involved
the U.S. is and has been in the domestic
politics of the region, is no longer tenable
or tolerable.
In short, the time has come to put
U.S. policy toward the Middle East on the
agenda. Support for international efforts,
including the efforts of Middle Eastern
states, to resolve the current crisis by diplomatic means, is imperative. This means
support for: the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty; the adjudication of the·oil pricing
controversy which antedated the crisis; the
implementation of UN. resolutions for the
Gulf and other areas of the Middle East;
and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Saudi Arabia.
Controversy over the issue of 'linkage' between the ·Gulf crisis and the
Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a diversion.
That conflict is an inextricable part of
Middle Eastern politics, no matter how
exploited, and it should be resolved on its

wants to avoid confrontation with a region
that does not confonn to its image in the
U.S. In fact, Arab politics, with all its
internal differences, challenges both the
Israeli and U.S. views of the Arab world
and Palestinian policies.
The agenda on the Middle East, freed
of such restrictions, must include one fundamental question: what are U.S. interests
in the Gulf and the Middle East? How is it
that some former Reagan administration
officials contest that this is an area necessary for the "national security" while this
administration says the reverse? Why has
no congressional voice been raised to
question exactly what the administration
means when its officials talk of an extended stay in the Gulf! And what of oil companies, and their exceptionally low profile? And what of arms, and specifically,
the contribution of the U.S. and most of
the other states aligned against Iraq, to the
escalation of the arms race in the Middle
East?

The absence of any sustained discussion of what U.S.
interests are or should be, of how involved the U.S. is and
has been in the domestic politics of the region, is no longer
tenable or tolerable. In short, the ti,me has come to put U.S.
policy toward the Middle East on the agenda.
·
own terms and in the. interest of those
directly concerned. Clearly, the dynamic
of the present crisis may convince the
Bush administration that it is desirable to
move in this direction, in order to maintain
the Arab coalition supporting the U,.S. military presence on Saudi soil. One can
expect that support for such a move will
be followed by an even more intense
polarization in the discussion on the
American scene, where the subject of
Israel's Palestinian policy has long been
politically taboo.
It is more than that conflict that has
been taboo, however. An official silence,
supported by a broad consensus has long
been extended to discussion of U.S.-Middle East policies. This is a side effect of an
administration policy that at all costs
Ruist Newsletter

The Shifting World Environment
Admittedly, the environment in which
all of this is happening is changing rapidly
and the changes directly affect the unfolding situation in the region. Collaboration
with the Soviet Union, and the enhancement of the role of the UN, are two obvious shifts. The impact of the first on the
Middle East has yet to be assessed, but it
is safe to say that it has changed the overall balance of power. It changes the basis
of the Israeli relationship with the U.S.,
long justified in tenns of the need to contain the Cold War in the Middle East, as
well as to provide the U.S. with the capacity to confront nationalist, populist or radical movements within the region, and to
provide intelligence on the Arab world for
the same purpose.
Pag,Thr11

Unasked Questions
continued from page three

Given the new U.S./Soviet alignment,
the first justification is no longer relevan\
and the second and third may have diminished in importance. The current crisis
then may begin to erode U.S. support for
Israel, particularly if the interests of the
Israeli right wing government collide with
those of the U.S. over the matters of
expanding Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and UN. inspection teams
investigating Israeli violence against
Palestinians.
Within the Middle ·East, even short of
war, the crisis has already unsettled the
existing alignment of forces. The legacy of
wars, dislocation, and the sense of utter
hopelessness at achieving meaningful
political solutions of the Israeli/Palestinian
conflict and the Lebanese civil war, have
produced generations of people who know
only too well how selective the response
to their suffering has been. The violence of
indifference is no stranger here. Neither is
the casualty rate of poverty, the price paid
for forms of economic maldevelopment
that lead to the migration of labor, and
with it, often, the degradation of spirit and
of law.
That the Iraqi leader, whose brutality
is fully known, is capable of exploiting
this web of discontent, is a reflection of
the dire conditions in the region. Given
what Hussein's regime represents, his ability to generate support is not a simple
thing to countenance, or, indeed, to
explain. For many Saddam Hussein has
come to embody the only choice in the
face of what are perceived to be impossible odds. This is testimony to the failures
of Arab politics, as well as the hobbled
sovereignty of the states in the region.

Antecedents or the Present Crisis
Where, in this itemization of despair,
does responsibility lie? What accounts for
the deep resonance that this crisis has produced? Is it 1914 and the partition of the
Ottoman Empire, the precursor of today's
Middle East? Or is it developments since
1945 that offer the most meaningful parallels: the incomplete struggles for liberation
and independence across North Africa and
the Middle East; the creation of Israel and
the Palestine question; the emergence of
oil states with their black gold and reactionary politics; and the post-colonial
regional struggles? No attempt to think
through to the origins of the present crisis
can ignore the weight of a turbulent past,
or the impact of political struggles that
antedated the present crisis.
In the short term, the meaning of the
Pog,Four

Gulf crisis of 1990 has to be understood as
the continuation of a struggle initiated by
the fall of the Shah and the emergence of
fundamentalist Iran in 1979, which transformed the Middle East and resulted in the
mobilization of forces to contain Iran's
fundamentalist revolution. On the popular
level, fundamentalism soon became the
politics of opposition, before being coopted by states eager to increase their own
legitimacy.
In this context, the Iraqi regime came
to be the chosen force to contain the
expansion of Iranian fundamentalism, and
was backed in its efforts by the very powers of the Gulf and the U.S. now arrayed
against it. Iraq was also one of the chief
beneficiaries of the escalation of arms
going into the Gulf region in this period.
All of the states now joined in opposition
to Iraq are among the major suppliers of
lethal weapons to the Middle East In the
Gulf war, according to one estimate, some
41 states sold arms and ammunition to
either Iran or Iraq, and 28 to both.
(Michael Klare, "Who's Arming Who?"
The Technology Review, Mayllune 1990).
At the present time Iraq has the use of
sophisticated weapons and technology
purchased for an estimated $50 billion
over the past few years. What those
weapons are and what they are capable of
doing we are now familiar with, though
the bad news has long been available.
Why it should have been of so little interest is something we ought to be asking
ourselves.
Where does the U.S. stand in this situation? On the brink of war. With a mobilization of armed forces unequalled since
the Vietnam War, the U.S. has achieved
objectives in the Gulf previously considered politically impossible, namely, the
Saudi Arabian government's acceptance of
a U.S. military presence on its territory.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has deepened, though not fundamentally altered
U.S. interests in the region.
What we now see, U.S. support for
the oil rich regions of the Gulf and support
for Israel, constitute the twin poles of U.S.
policy, with the former the more fundamental to U.S. interests. This explains the
U.S. position during the Iran/Iraq war, and
the tilt toward Iraq which was premised not on the superiority of Iraq over Iran but on the principle of prohibiting any single regional power from dominating the
area. Then, it was Iran; now it is Iraq.
Kuwait's place in the American consciousness derives from this context
The U.S. commitment to access and
Ruisi Newsl,tt,r

control of petroleum resources in the Middle East goes back to the mid-1940's, as
National Security Council and Intelligence
reports on the region indicate. But the current crisis forces us to consider a corollary
to that commitment, namely, the extent to
which every major policy in the Middle
East has been subordinated to U.S. oil
interests. This is the calculation that has
influenced our choice of allies in the
region, shaped our economic and military
aid, and determined our position on the
social and political movements that have
rocked the area over the past forty years.
This is the calculation that explains support for regimes whose leaders have perilous little popular support, and whose
commitment to democracy is nonexistent.
It is ultimately this kind of reasoning that
made the prospect of depending on an
Arab solution to the Gulf crisis implausible, both because the stakes were so high
and because Washington knew how little
power these regimes could actually wield
under the circumstances.
No one watching the unfolding events
of the last few months could fail to ask
how it is that the U.S. did not appear to
recognize the dangers posed by the Iraqi
regime prior to the invasion of Kuwait.
Why didn't the Bush administration, or the
international community, call a global alert
when faced with the knowledge of Iraqi
use of chemical weapons against Kurds
and Iranians? The information was available, the political will absent. Why were
U.S. sanctions not applied? Why did the
Congressional delegation meet with Saddam Hussein and find him a potentially
compatible partner?
The dismal state of "discourse" on the
Middle East which classified regimes as
"moderates" or "extremists" has had deeper effects than we are prepared to admit.
We know better now, and time is running
out to question U.S. policy in the Middle
East, and to challenge Congressional indifference.
10/15J.}()
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Irene Gendzier teaches the History of the
Middle East and development issues in
Political Science al Boston University.
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Hussein and the rhetoric about "Hoo
Sane" as Hitler have done little to inform
us about the causes of the war, and instead
have served to mobilize for war on the
basis of racism. (One exception is David
Hirst's insightful discussion of Hussein's
childhood in the Manchester Guardian.
Hirst's description of the physical and
emotional abuse inflicted on Hussein as a
child are reminiscent of psychoanalyst
Alice Miller's study of Hitler's tormented
youth, and remind us of the horrible
dimensions in the cycle of child abuse.)
Many rationales and forces drive a
nation to war. Deeply indebted by a
decade of conflict with Iran, the Iraqi government needed cash. The billions of dollars it owed to the Emirate of Kuwait
could be written off by a puppet government Cash to relieve its debts could be
recovered from Kuwaiti banks and its
investments around the world, as well as
from selling Kuwait's oil. By controlling
Kuwait, Iraq could ensure that it would
never again steal from the Rumaila oil
field, or drive down the value of Iraq's oil
exports by exceeding its OPEC quota.

As the U.S. military intervention
against Iraq has ignited support among
masses of people across the Arab world
for Saddam Hussein, it has become
increasingly clear that there was more to
his invasion of Kuwait than madness,
megalomania and the pursuit of plunder.
Hussein did speak the truth when he rationalized the invasion, saying he sought to
erase the wounds of colonialism.
The national boundaries of the Middle
East are the legacy of the colonial era. In
some cases they reflect the outcome of
struggles between the colonial powers. In
other cases the boundaries were drawn to
enforce policies of divide and conquer or
to increase the dependence of newly independent nations. While it had enjoyed considerable autonomy over many centuries,
Kuwait did not exist as a nation until
Britain created it in an effort to circumscribe Iraq's power by limiting its direct
access to the Persian Gulf. During the
Ottoman Empire, the Emirs of Kuwait
paid tribute to their overlords in Baghdad.
Since 19'58, when the British-imposed
monarchy in Iraq was toppled, Baghdad
has claimed all or part of Kuwait It was
fear that the 1958 Iraqi revolution would
spill over into Kuwait that led the Eisenhower administration to threaten Iraq with
nuclear attack and to position troops
anned with short range nuclear weapons
in Lebanon - the third of six times that
Washington threatened to lallllch nuclear
11230

Student groups join in Boston demonstration
against U.S. militarization in the Gulf,
Oct. 20, 1990. Photo: Ellen Shub.
war during Middle East conflicts.
Pan-Arab id~logy was another force
behind Hussein's invasion. It springs from
the shared religious, cultural and historical
traditions that first unified much of Southwest Asia, the Levant and North Africa in
the "golden age" that followed the Islamic
conquest of the region by Arabians. Since
the days of Gammal Nasser in Egypt,
many in the Arab world have looked for a
powerful leader who could reunify the
"Arab nation" and right the wrongs of foreign occupiers and corrupt rulers. The
Emir of Kuwait and the monarchies of the
Gulf have been deeply resented for their
failure to share their vast oil wealth with
the poorer· nations and peoples of the
region. It was to destabilize these U.S.
clients and to reinforce his own base of
support within Iraq that Hussein issµed his
call for Holy War.
Finally, Hussein has long sought to
establish Iraq as the dominant regional
power in the Gulf. It was his desire to
replace the deposed Shah as the most powerful regional leader, and his belief that
post-revolutionary Iran could be quickly
defeated that led him to order his army to
cross the Shatt al Arab into Iran. He may
have concluded that in the confusion and
wicertainty of the emerging post-Cold War
environment, he could occupy and
"digest" Kuwait before the world could
respond.

Rui.Tt Newsldter

U.S. Intervention and the Price of Oil
Just as the U.S. war in Indochina was
no accident, but the logical consequence
of fifteen years of Cold War ideology and
the Kennedy administration's military policy of "flexible response," the U.S. intervention in the Gulf is the (il)logical consequence of the repeated commitments of
successive presidents - from FDR's well
photographed summit with King Saud,
through the Carter Doctrine and the Reagan/Bush policy of "Discriminate Deterrence." Over the past decade, instead of
pursuing diplomatic options for conflict
resolution, or an energy policy that would
truly serve U.S. and environmental interests, the U.S. has invested in preparations
for war in the Middle East
The Reagan-era military spending
spree funded not only Star Wars but military bases in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kenya,
Somalia, Morocco, Diego Garcia and a
host of other nations. It financed the
expansion of the U.S. Navy for precisely
the kind of intervention we are now witnessing. It was also the period during
which the Rapid Deployment Force was
transformed into the Pentagon's Central
Command. The pressure on Bush and the
national security establishment in Washington to rely on the contingency plans,
bases, hardware and policies already in
pJace, despite informed calls for diplomacy and patience by such elite figures as
Zbigniew Brzezinski and former Secretary
of the Navy West has been overwhelming.
Page Five
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President Bush was right when he
said Iraq's invasion of Kuwait threatened
our "way of life." While the U.S. intervention may be making the world safe for
feudalism and monarchies, it is hardly a
pursuit of democratic values (and like all
wars it will undennine democratic value.~
and structure~ within the U.S.) Since the
end of World War II the U.S. "way of life"
has, in large measure, been based on its
access to cheap oil and its unquestioned
role as the hegemonic power in the oil rich
Middle East (After factoring in inflation,
the price of oil was at its lowest level in
thirty years immediately before the Iraqi
invasion.) The invasion of Kuwait challenged both the U.S.'s ability to control oil
prices, and its role as the final arbiter in
the Middle East. As Thomas Friedman
wrote in the New York Times, "This is
about money, and protecting governments
loyal to America and punishing those
which are not, and about who will set the
price of oil."
It is extremely unlikely that Hussein
planned to invade Saudi Arabia. That
country had long coordinated its oil production policies with Iraq and had recently
negotiated a non-aggression pact with
Hussein. While not as powerful as Iraq,
the Saudi military is larger and technologically far more advanced than was
Kuwait's. Most importantly, throughout
the Cold War, Hussein had observed that
the Soviet Union never threatened the
Saudi monarchy or U.S. dominance 'in the
Gulf - in the words of former chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, "the jugular vein of western
capitalism. An attack on Saudi Arabia
would have guaranteed an overwhelming
U.S. attack on Iraq.
By adding Kuwait's vast oil reserves
to those of Iraq, and by deploying his
army within range of Saudi oil fields, Hussein may well have sought to wield greater
influence over the price of oil. At the time
of the Iraqi invasion, he was pressing
OPEC to raise the price of oil to $25 per
barrel, while the Saudis were willing to
settle for $21, a difference of 5 cents per
gallon. As Friedman wrote, one reason
that the Bush administration is
sending...soldiers to Saudi Arabia is for
the sake of five cents a gallon."
11
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''Burdensharing'' and U.S. Global Power
The U.S. "way of life," and the global
power on which it has been built, have
been reinforced by U.S. power in the Middle East It is control over the flow of Mid-
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die East oil that has given the U.S. enormous influence over the economies and
policies of its allies: Western Europe,
Japan, and the newly industrialized countries of the Pacific. This, and our cowboy
culture, help explain why the Bush administration was unwilling to let UN. sanctions take their toll before dispatching
ground troops and unilaterally establishing
a naval blockade.
Bush's response to Iraq's invasion created the political environment in which
"butdensharing" could be further institutionalized. Its response also provided the
political cover for U.S. troops to be
deployed in large numbers to the bases
built in Saudi Arabia during the Reagan
years. Bush has used the confrontation to
win agreements to build more U.S. bases
in the region and to create a new alliance,
including Syria, to reinforce U.S. power in
the Middle East.
As Bob Borosage and Michael T.
Klare have described so well in the pages
of The Nation, the Bush administration has
used the crisis to shape the post-Cold War
era. At a time when it faced increased economic competition from its Trilateral partners, Japan and Western Europe, it was
anxious to discipline them and to reassert
its leadership. Not only did Japan, in an
unprecedented move, support the U .N.
sanctions and provide billions of dollars in
aid to Arab nations suffering because of
lost trade with Iraq, it has also accepted
heavier ''burdensharing" with promises to
increase its subsidy for U.S. bases in
Japan, possibly by as much as three billion
dollars a year.
Though the U.S. 's European (and
Arab) allies have been hesitant to deploy
significant numbers of troops or ships to
Saudi Arabia or the Gulf, the European
willingness to allow the use of NATO
bases and forces for "out-of area" operations in the Middle East has confirmed the
U.S.'s ability to use its European pillar of
power in pursuit of its global interests.
Washington has thus opened the post-Cold
War era by consolidating considerable
power over its major economic and geopolitical rivals.
These are, of course, short term gains.
Like Vietnam War operations that required
the destruction of villages in order to
"save" them, war in the Gulf will leave the
oil fields burning and may well undermine
the monarchies and autocracies it seeks to
protect The sight of predominantly white
''Christian" U.s.· troops decimating Arab
lives and land could well lead to massive

Resi.JI Newsleller

Veterans were among those
at recent Boston demo
against war in the Gulf.
Photo: Ellen Shub.
demonstrations, coups and revolutions
throughout the Arab world, as happened in
1967 when Israel defeated Egypt, Syria
and Jordan. When this military binge is
over, the U.S. will find that its economy is
even less competitive with those of Japan
and Europe than it was before. Billions of
dollars, precious time, and precious human
resources are once again being flushed
down a military rat hole.

War, Wild Cards, and Burning Oil
The destructive power of the U.S.
armada, Air Force, and land army
deployed in the Gulf is awesome. The air·c raft carriers and nearly all other ships the
U.S. has deployed in the Gulf region are
armed with missiles and tactical nuclear
weapons. AWACs, stealth fighters, B-1
and B-52 bombers can control the skies
and destroy everything below them. Since
the early-1980s, U.S. ground forces have
been trained to fight nuclear as well as
conventional war. Iraq has missiles that
can reach Jidda and Tel Aviv. and Hussein
has a history of resorting to chemical warfare and using his missiles against cities
and innocent civilians. While Bush and
Hussein can be certain that a U.S.-Iraq war
will be devastating and very bloody, there
are many uncertainties beyond the control
of either Washington or Baghdad.
Economic sanctions, diplomacy and a
drawn out confrontation could force Hussein to back down, as he did in his war
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with Iran. No one will win a U.S.-Iraq war.
Hussein's cynical decision to take hostages
guarantees that innocent people on all
sides will die in the event of a U.S. attack.
Should Bush decide that he will not be
held hostage to hostages, he will still be
faced with the fact that oil burns. A
ground war to retain Kuwait or to topple
Hussein will put the oil fields that Bush
believes he must control out of commission for many months - if not longer.
Should Bush pursue the option of attempting to assassinate Hussein, he faces the
probability that a successor will be as
uncompromising.
As the October 8 Israeli fusillade at
the Temple Mount/Harme al Sherif, which
killed 21 Palestinians and wounded 140,
and the October 12 assassination of the
Speaker of Egypt's parliament demonstrated, there are also many wild cards.
What incidents will lead Israel to take
independent action and to once again
bomb Iraq's nuclear reactors and research
facilities? How would Hussein respond ·to
the sinking of an Iraqi ship? Would Bush
retaliate if a U.S plane is shot down, or if a
U.S. ship is again "accidentally" attacked
by an Exocet missile? Responses to sabotage and terrorism are unpredictable, and
under pressure or attack Hussein might
choose to lob a missile into Tel Aviv as he
has threatened. Once the first missile is
launched, escalation to full-scale war
could all too easily follow.
This is a frightening moment. It is
frightening because of the military power
deployed in the Middle East and its potential for wreaking monumental destruction.
The war at home is also frightening. The
Bush administration's efforts to create a
war fever have whipped up anti-Arab
racism, reinforced militarism, and have
made the possibility of economic and
social reconstruction of the U.S. even
more remote.
The responsibilities of the peace
movement in this period should be clear.
We must condemn and resist both the Iraqi
invasion and the U.S. intervention. All foreign armies should go home. All of them.
The way forward is through creative
diplomacy and the forceful use of the economic sanctions that the U.N., with the
support of the Bush administration, has
rightly imposed. (These do not include
embargoes of food and humanitarian supplies.) It lies in active diplomacy supporting all nations' rights to self-determination
and security, including Kuwait's and
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Palestine's as well as Israel's. It lies in
continuing efforts to convert the U.S.'s faltering wartime economy into a productive
economy that serves the security of the
people of the U.S. This is a time for
demonstrations, civil disobedience, pickets
and vigils, letters to the editor, telephone
calls, and letters and visits to members of
Congress. We've been here before and we
know the way.
10/15/90

•

Joseph Gerson is the Peace Education
Secretary of the New England Regional
Office of the American Friends Service
Committee. He is the co-editor of The Sun
Never Sets ...Confronting the Network of
Foreign U.S. Military Bases to be published this winter by South End Press. This
article. prepared for Resist is an updated
and expanded version of an earlier piece
which appeared in Peacework (Sept.,
19<JO).

**********************
We Thought You Might
be Interested...
The 1991 War Resisters League's
Peace Calendar is a book you 'II want to
refer to for more than upcoming demos
and meetings. Edited by Pat Farren of
AFSC, and with an introduction by
Maggie Kuhn of the Gray Panthers, A
Way of Life honors women and men who
have invested their lives in work for
justice and peace. Each page of the desk
calendar profiles an activist from a
different state, including biographical
information, a short essay and a
photograph. Many of the individuals
portrayed are those who work behind the
scenes and rarely get the recognition they
so deserve. From Vietnam era protesters
to young campus radicals, from civil
rights workers to organizers fighting for
the rights of recent immigrants and
refugees, these stories are what we need
to encourage all of us in the ongoing
struggle for justice in the U.S. and the
world. The calendar was co-published by
the War Resisters League and New
Society Publishers, and is available for
$9.95. For ordering info, call (212) 2280450.
Ruut Newsltttttr

tion, an Affordable Housing Conference,
and annual week-long programs focused
on Central America. The Center has a
strong commitment to coalition work
around critical local issues such as housing, voter registration in public housing
projects, and opposition to KKK presence
in the area.
The Center's goals are to promote a
region-wide climate of open discussion
and greater sensitivity to both local and
international peace and justice issues; to
provide technical assistance to other
groups; to respond to local acts of social
violence and militarism; and to serve as a
clearinghouse for educational resources.
The organization provides an extensive
collection of journals, audio-visuals and
books; publishes a monthly newsletter .
with a calendar of area political projects
and events; and provides a speaker's
bureau. Projects include the Military
Recruitment Awareness Project which
works with teachers to present young people with information that will enable them
to make critically discerning decisions
about the military as a career.
The Frederick County Citizen's Task
Force on Economic Conversion, another
project of the Center,' seeks. to inform
activists, elected officials and business and
community leaders on alternative priorities
for federal spending. The Center wants to
see tax dollars returned to the community
for economic development and job training independent of military contracts. The
organization's extensive research has
found that local citizens pay approximately
$2(i()() each annually in federal taxes,
out of which 50% goes directly to the military, a total amounting to more than2 1/2
times what the County spends on edlr....ation. The Conversion project aims to
reveal the negative effects of military
spending on the local communitv. and the
positive prospects for economic conversion - specifically examining how the
personnel, resources and facilities of local
military contractors could be used to meet
the real needs of the community.
Resist's grant was used toward a publicity campaign for the Conversion project,
so that facts about t!1e local impact of military spending could be widely disseminated in display ads, brochures and op-ed
articles. The Center also plans to include
updatedinformationabout conversion in
its newsletter; and to hold a local confer·ence on the topic focusing on both local
and national conversion issues.
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In this issue of Resist we highlight recent
grants to peace and anti-militarist groups.
The information in these brief reports is
provided to us by the groups themselves.
For more information, please contact
them at the addresses provided.
Veterans Peace Action Teams, P.O. Box
170670, San Francisco, CA, 94117.
Veterans Peace Action Teams (VPA1)
was formed by S. Brian Willson and Duncan Murphy following their fast on the
capitol steps protesting U.S. policies in
Central America in the fall of 1986. VPAT
recruits, trains, and sends veterans and
non-veterans to stand in solidarity with
people who are directly suffering the
effects of U.S. foreign and domestic policy. In 1987, VPAT was invited by the
Nicaraguan Union of Fanners and Ranchers (UNAG) to send construction brigades
to the Cua-Bocay valley to repair damage
caused by the contras. Five subsequent
VPAT teams rebuilt a destroyed health
clinic in El Cedro, a fann cooperative in
the valley, and built latrines and a school.
VPAT, now with a 12-person, multiracial board and a two-person staff,
believes that all military veterans are
indoctrinated with a racist, sexist and
homophobic nationalism sustained by militarism. The organization seeks the personal transformation of U.S. veterans and the
social transfonnation of U.S. society away
from militarism and violence. VPAT is
opposed to all fonns of U.S. intervention
in other countries, "particularly where
such intervention changes the natural
development of a people or nation." Many
VPAT members are combat veterans,
many from the Vietnam war. Their participation in convoys and delegations has pro-

vided a way for these vets to reevaluate
and heal from their own pain, transforming grief and anger into action. VPAT is
active in pursuing social change in concert
with other groups focused on peace and
justice issues.
VPAT is committed to helping preserve the accomplishments of the
Nicaraguan revolution. Currently there are
four long-term VPAT members in
Nicaragua in a five-year development project with UNAG to revitalize coffee production in the Cua-Bocay valley. The
VPAT health brigade in Nicaragua is carrying on its work with emotional and
stress related illnesses, and popular health
education. VPAT also works on behalf of
wounded combatants in El Salvador, and
plans to provide accompaniment to returning Salvadoran refugees.
In the U.S., VPAT has begun to
respond to Dine (Navajo) and Hopi
requests for aid at Big Mountain, believing
that the same U.S.policy of "low-intensity
warfare" practiced in Central America is
resulting in cultural genocide of native
peoples here at home. In March, 1989,
Elders from both tribes asked VPAT to
organize a convoy of aid to help them
resist forced relocation from their ancestral
homelands, and to focus public attention
on the struggle. VPAT worked with existing Big Mountain support groups, environmental groups, and veterans groups to
bring material aid from over 30 cities in
the U.S. to some 300 families living on the
former Joint Use Area. VPAT also coordinated a campaign of public education and
publicity. Resist's grant was used to create
and distribute organizing packets for the
Big Mountain Convoy.

r - - - - - - - - - -Join
- - -the
- -Resist
- - - -Pledge
- - - -Program
--------------7
We'd like you to consider becoming a
Resist Pledge. Pledges account for over
25% of our income. By becoming a
pledge, you help guarantee Resist a
fixed ~nd dependa~le source of inco~e
on which we can bmld our grant makmg
program. In return, we will send you a
monthly pledge letter and reminder,
along with your newsletter. We will
keep you up-to-date on the groups we
have funded, and the other work being
done at Resist. So take the plunge and
become a Resist Pledge! We count on
you, and the groups we fund count on
us.

•

Yes! l would like to become a Resist
Pledge. I'd like to pledge$._ _ _ _ /
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (monthly, bimonthly, quarterly, 2x a year, yearly).
Enclosed is my pledge contribution

•

P.O. Box 330056, Miami, Florida, 33233-

0056.
The Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom, (WILPF) has been
working on peace and anti-militarism
issues since 1915, focusing on the roots of
war and on the peaceful resolution of conflict. The organization's current national
priorities are racial justice, disarmament
by the year 2000, ending US global intervention, and a renewed commitment to
women's rights. WILPFs U.S. section has
been made up of four regions since the
early 1970s.
The southeastern region, region 3, has
participated in demonstrations against the
militarization of the space program at
Cape Canaveral, and at the Savannah
River Plant, and has organized around the
federal budget, civil rights, U.S. intervention in Ceo tral America, farm worker
issues, labor issues, reproductive rights
and environmental issues. Despite the
commitment of the long-time members,
the Southeast region of WILPF has always
had the fewest members and fewest local
"branches." Because of this, and the harsh
political climate, the region has initiated
an aggressive program of outreach for the
organization in the southeast
In order to demonstrate the special
relevance of WILPF for a wide variety of
women in the region, WII..PF organized its
biennial meeting this fall to include workshops on racism, women's impoverishment, institutional child neglect, immigration injustices, militarization, the
disproportionately high numbers of
women at southern military bases, and
women in prison - including the re_placement for the high security unit for women,
fonnerly in Lexington, KY, now in place
in Marianna, Florida. Resist's grant was
used to do widespread outreach for this
meeting, and to assist women to participate by providing scholarships.

of $

Peace Resource Center, 8 West Church

----·
I can't join the pledge program just
now, but here's a contribution to support your work. $_ _ __
Name _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

St, P.O. Box 7, Frederick, MD, 21701.
The Peace Resource Center, established and sponsored by Western Maryland Clergy and Laity Concerned, was
founded in 1986 to promote peace, social
justice and environmental sanity in the
Frederick, Maryland area. Members of the
Center have organized a broad range of
educational events including an annual
Martin Luther King Memorial Celebra-
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Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
City /State/Zip _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Resist
One Summer Street, Somerville, MA 02143 • (617) 623-5110
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